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Abstract
E¤ects of direct ights on trade costs are investigated using micro price data at the city
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1 Introduction
The increase in air transportation/travel due to the technological development in
jet aircraft engines has led to the improvement of global market integration signif-
icantly since World War II. This improvement has been partly achieved by the in-
crease in air shipment due to lower air transportation costs,1 and partly due to the
face-to-face business meetings that overcome informational asymmetries in interna-
tional trade, because, as indicated by Rauch (2001), the reduction in informal trade
barriers through business and social networks is one of the key factors facilitating
trade. Therefore, there is no doubt that air transportation/travel has signicantly
contributed to welfare-improving globalization.
Within this picture, direct ights have gained more importance, because, com-
pared to the inconvenience of transferring ights and the additional ying time, di-
rect ights provide the cheapest/fastest air travel and air transportation. Regarding
the role of direct ights in air travel, a direct ight facilitates a business travel by
considerably reducing the journey costs, including the opportunity cost of time. By
reducing the travel time, direct ights also allow business people to have face-to-
face meetings, expand the knowledge of alternative markets, augment their reciprocal
1Hummels (2007) shows that by the year of 2000, air shipments were representing a third of the
value of U.S. imports and more than half of U.S. exports with countries outside North America.
Similarly, again in 2000, excluding land neighbors, the air share of import value was more than 30
percent for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
1
trust and thus increase the likelihood of trade.2 For example, Alderighi and Gaggero
(2012) have found that the elasticity of exports to direct ights is about 10%, which
is mostly attributed to the increasing role of business traveling in maintaining and
reinforcing commercial relations; Cristea (2011) and Poole (2013) have shown that
business travel helps to overcome informational asymmetries in international trade
by generating international sales in the form of new export relationships.
Regarding the role of direct ights in air transportation, Micco and Serebrisky
(2006) have shown that Open Skies Agreements (OSAs) between the U.S. and other
countries, which allow airlines to operate direct ights internationally, reduce air
transport costs by 9% and increase by 7% the share of imports arriving by air. Simi-
larly, Winston and Yan (2015) investigate OSAs from a welfare perspective and show
that they have generated at least $4 billion in annual gains to travelers. As regards
the importance of time spent in transportation, Hummels and Schaur (2013) esti-
mate that each day in transit is equivalent to an ad-valorem tari¤ of 0.6% to 2.3%,
where due to having a direct ight, the travel time between, for example, Taipei and
Shanghai is cut from more than 5 hours to around one and a half hours (see Chang
et al., 2011). Moreover, studies such as by Bel and Fageda (2008) have found that
the availability of direct ights has a large inuence on the location of large rms
headquarters, which is another factor facilitating trade. Finally, studies such as by
Cristie, Hillberry and Mattoo (2014) have discussed the importance of direct ights
2See Frankel (1998), Rauch (1999), Kulendran and Wilson (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002).
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(through plurilateral air services agreements) in passenger tra¢ c, which is another
factor in the removal of informational trade barriers.
Considering the discussion so far, this paper attempts to measure the e¤ects of
direct ights on trade costs between cities by introducing and using a micro price data
set on 22 traded goods at the retail level across 433 cities covering 114 countries.3 Such
a rich data set allows us to consider the e¤ects of direct ights on trade costs for both
international and intranational city pairs. Trade costs are dened as the arbitrage
costs measured by the maximum price di¤erence between traded input prices across
cities in order to control for local retail/distribution costs. We also work with time-
averaged (long-run) data to eliminate the transitory variations in prices, such as those
due to exchange rates. The results show that the existence of direct ights between
cities negatively and signicantly reduces trade costs. This result is robust to the
consideration of many control variables and nonlinearities in the e¤ects of distance
on trade costs.
We also consider the possible endogeneity of having direct ights between cities by
investigating potential international policies. It is shown that the existence of direct
ights are positively a¤ected by air services agreements signed between countries. One
example is the policy of the U.S. through OSAs, the rst of which has been signed
between the U.S. and Netherlands in 1992. According to the U.S. Department of
State, as of 2015, the U.S. currently has OSAs with more than 100 countries, and over
3The data have been downloaded from http://www.numbeo.com/ which is the worlds largest
database of user contributed data about cities. See the data section below for more details.
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70 percent of international departures from the United States nowy to OSA partners.
Other examples include Multilateral Agreement on the Establishment of a European
Common Aviation Area signed by many European countries among themselves, A
Common Aviation Area Agreement and Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement of
the E.U. with countries outside of Europe. Since direct ights a¤ected by such policies
are further shown to reduce trade costs through a two-stage endogeneity analysis, it
is implied that international air services agreements are signicant policy tools for
reducing trade costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section uses a retail model
to measure trade costs. Section 3 depicts the details of the estimation methodology
and the data. Section 4 reveals the empirical results together with many robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes by providing policy suggestions.
2 The Measurement of Trade Costs
Data for trade costs are either non-existing, excluding informal barriers to trade, or
not covering the globe.4 Accordingly, many existing studies in the literature have con-
sidered disaggregate price information across countries to measure trade costs. The
4Even the most detailed data sets, such as the one on the U.S. international trade (that can be
obtained from http://dataweb.usitc.gov/), exclude information on informal barriers to trade and
can at most provide data for the calculated duties and the cost of all freight, insurance, and other
charges incurred; they do not cover, for instance, trade costs due to search frictions or time to ship.
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common strategy based on international/intranational studies considers the arbitrage
condition for retail prices; i.e., consumers search for the minimum retail price and or-
der/purchase the product from the low-price location after taking trade costs into
account. Since the largest observed price di¤erence between locations provides infor-
mation about the limit that the arbitrage condition imposes, the recent literature has
estimated trade costs using inequality moments. Examples of this strategy include
the intercity price analysis study by Borraz et al. (2014) using the price data ob-
tained by the Billion Prices Project at MIT, together with international trade studies
by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Simonovska and Waugh (2014), among many others,
in the literature.5 One problem with this strategy is that retail prices of traded goods
consist of both traded and non-traded input prices, where the latter mostly refers to
local distribution costs. Accordingly, studies such as by Crucini and Yilmazkuday
(2014) have considered arbitrage opportunities only for the traded-input prices; this
can be achieved by controlling the retail prices for the local distribution costs (as we
do in this paper). In order to be consistent with the exiting literature, we directly
follow these studies while measuring trade costs, below.
5The estimation of inequality moments has also been achieved by Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004),
Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), Andrews and Soares (2010), Andrews and Shi (2014), Pono-
mareva and Tamer (2011), and Rosen (2008).
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2.1 Arbitrage Condition for Traded-Input Prices
When traded inputs of the same retail good across two locations are perfect substitutes
(e.g., 1kg of rice in a New York City wholesaler versus 1kg of rice in an Istanbul rice
wholesaler), one has to control the observed retail prices for local retail/distribution
costs. Accordingly, as in Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), we dene retail prices as
follows:
P gi = Zi (Q
g
i )
g (Wi)
1 g (1)
where P gi is the retail price of good g in location i, Zi is the inverse retail productivity
in location i,Wi is the local wage in location i, Q
g
i is the traded-input (e.g., wholesale)
price of good g in location i, and g is the traded input share of good g that is common
across all locations. Log relative prices between locations i and j are implied as
follows:
pgij = zij + 
gqgij + (1  g)wij (2)
where pgij = log
 
P gi =P
g
j

, qgij = log
 
Qgi =Q
g
j

, zij = log (Zi=Zj) and wij = log (Wi=Wj).
Following Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014), for the identication of qgijs, we follow a
two-stage approach to control for retail costs.
The rst stage utilizes geometric mean regression (to control for any measurement
errors) on the available data for relative prices and relative wages to estimate the
following expression:
pgij|{z}
Relative Price Data
= (1  g) wij|{z}
Wage Data
+ p0gij|{z}
Relative Prices Controlled for Local Wages
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where, according to Equation 2, residuals of p0gij = zij +
gqgij represent relative prices
controlled for local wages; we also obtain an estimated value for g by this estima-
tion.6 In this rst stage, we assume that wages are orthogonal to retail productivities
and traded-input prices. It is implied that zijs measure the part of the local retail
costs that cannot be measured by wages, such as infrastructure or location-specic
markups.
The second stage uses the relative prices controlled for local wages to estimate the
following expression:
p0gij|{z}
Relative Prices Controlled for Local Wages
= zij|{z}
Fixed E¤ects
+ g qgij|{z}
Relative Traded-Input Prices
where xed e¤ects (i.e., zijs) are orthogonal to relative traded-input prices (i.e., q
g
ijs)
by construction. Once gqgijs are obtained as residuals, using 
gs estimated in the
rst stage, we identify the traded input prices qgijs.
The traded input prices qgijs are subject to arbitrage after controlling for trade
costs. More specically, the arbitrage condition for traded input prices of good g
between locations i and j is given by :
qgij = q
g
i   qgj  log  ij (3)
where  ji represents the gross multiplicative trade/arbitrage costs from location j
to location i. According to this arbitrage condition, it must be the case that the
traded-input prices in location i is lower than the traded-input prices in location j
6The estimated values of gs at the good level are provided in Online Appendix tables.
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plus trade costs; otherwise, the product would have been imported from location j
until this condition would hold with inequality one more time. The interesting point
is that this condition is bilateral, because the story holds for the potential imports of
location j from location i; hence, we can also write:
qgji = q
g
j   qgi  log  ij (4)
where we have considered symmetric trade costs due to  ij =  ji. The last two
arbitrage conditions can be combined as follows:
qgi   qgj   log  ij (5)
where jj is the absolute value operator. When the maximum (i.e., the upper bound)
of the left hand side is considered as the maximum traded-input price di¤erence across
goods between locations i and j, the last inequality turns into an equality as follows:
log  ij = max
g
qgi   qgj 	 (6)
which we use as our measure of trade/arbitrage costs.
It is important to emphasize that our trade cost denition is broad enough to
capture any transportation costs and international border related costs as well as
any information frictions. Since we control for local retail/distribution costs, our
denition of trade costs is slightly di¤erent from studies such as by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) who have a broader denition of trade costs as capturing even
distribution costs. Other related studies such as by Allen (2014) have distinguished
8
between transportation costs and information frictions; in the absence of an interna-
tional border, while the case of complete information in Allen (2014) implies that  ij
in this paper corresponds to transportation costs (i.e., no information frictions), the
case of incomplete information implies that  ij captures both transportation costs
and information frictions. Since we are interested in investigating the e¤ects of di-
rect ights on informational trade barriers, our analysis corresponds to the case of
incomplete information by keeping information frictions as a part of the trade costs.
3 Empirical Methodology and Data
Once trade costs are obtained (as described in the previous subsection), we are in-
terested in nding the e¤ects of having direct ights between cities. Accordingly, we
consider the following regression investigating the trade costs between cities i and j:
log  ij = 0 + 1fij + 2 log dij + 3bij +
X
k
3+kx
k
ij (7)
where fij is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there is any direct ight between
cities i and j, dij is the great circle distance in miles between cities i and j, bij is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 when there is an international border between
cities i and j, and nally xkijs represent a set of control variables including city
xed e¤ects (capturing any city characteristics such as its size, geographical location,
being on a coast, etc.) as well as variables at the bilateral country level (i.e., control
variables that are common across city pairs located in two specic countries) that are
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standard in international studies, including having a common land border, language,
colony or regional trade agreement (RTA).7
Micro price data include observations of 22 traded goods at the retail level ob-
tained from 433 cities (covering 114 countries) for the years between 2010 and 2014.8
The complete lists of goods and cities are given in Online Appendix tables, while the
coverage of cities are depicted on the world map in Figure 1, where we have multi-
ple cities from many countries. The data also include "Average Monthly Disposable
Salary (After Tax)" which we accept as our wage data. The data have been down-
loaded from http://www.numbeo.com/ which is the worlds largest database of user
contributed data about cities. Users of Numbeo can enter the micro prices that they
observe either at the good level or by using the price collection sheet provided by
the web page. Since the price data are user contributed, Numbeo uses alternative
methodologies to lter out noise data. First, the user provided data are checked for
outliers manually.9 Second, one quarter of lowest and highest inputs are discarded as
7While a common land border refers to city pairs that are located in neighbor countries (through
a land border), an international border refers to city pairs located in di¤erent countries that do
not necessarily share a land border. All of the country-level control variables are set equal to 1 for
intranational city pairs. It is important to emphasize that such a strategy does not a¤ect anything
in the regression results, because the e¤ects of having an international border is already controlled
by bij .
8Although the original data set includes 49 retail goods, we ignored the goods that are non-traded
in our investigation, since such goods may not be subject to arbitrage opportunities due to trade.
9For example, for a particular price in a city, when values contributed are 5, 6, 20, and 4 in a
reasonable time span, the value of 20 is discarded as a noise.
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borderline cases. Third, Numbeo uses heuristic technology that discards data which
most likely are incorrect statistically.
Using the model-implied traded-input prices, we calculate log trade costs according
to the following version of Equation 6 in the long run:
log  ij = max
g
qgi   qgj 	 = max
g
 P
t
qgi;t   qgj;t
T
!
(8)
where, as indicated in Table 1, the number of city pairs is 90,743 (= 10; 676 + 80; 067),
and number of international city pairs are much higher than the number of intrana-
tional city pairs. The use of time-averaged data is designed to eliminate the transitory
variations in prices, such as the ones due to exchange rates. As is evident in Table 1,
on average, trade costs between international city pairs (i.e., city pairs having an inter-
national border) are about 50% higher compared to intranational city pairs (i.e., city
pairs within a country). Compared to the existing literature based on international
trade costs, the magnitude of trade costs in this paper are relatively lower. In partic-
ular, based on earlier and di¤erent data sets, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) have
estimated international trade costs about 170% (ad-valorem tax equivalent), while
the implied international trade costs in Eaton and Kortum (2002) are about %190;
nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that these values in the literature are not
fully comparable to the values in this paper, since they are at the country level, and
they have not been controlled for local retail/distribution costs. The results in this
paper regarding the size of intranational trade costs are in line with studies such as
by Allen (2014) who, by using a smaller set of goods within Philippines, has recently
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estimated ad-valorem tax equivalent trade costs as ranging between 47% and 101%,
where the former represents pure transportation costs, while the latter represents the
summation of transportation costs and information frictions.
The data for direct ights have been obtained from Airline Route Mapper for the
year 2013. The data include information on 63,149 direct ights from around the
world where the name of the airlines and airports are also provided. Considering the
provided airport codes and names, we determined the exact location of the airports
(in terms of their latitudes and longitudes) and the countries in which they are located
by using Google Maps.
By using Google Maps, we also calculated the exact location of cities in our price
data (in terms of their latitudes and longitudes). Considering these locations, we
calculated the great circle distance between them in miles to be used in the regression
analysis (see Table 1). Furthermore, in order to determine whether there is a direct
ight between any two cities in our price data, we searched for the airports within 50
miles of the city centers by using the airport location data we have. We found that
for some cities, there are no airports within 50 miles, while for some others, there are
more than one airport; summary statistics are provided in Table 1 where the number
of city pairs with direct ights is 10,676 (out of 90,743). For a given city pair for
which prices are compared, we produced the binary variable of having direct ights
(using the direct ight data that we have) by taking into account all airports within
50 miles of the analyzed cities.
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As shown in Table 1, when all city pairs in the sample are considered, the average
trade costs are about %111:5 for city pairs with at least one direct ight, while they
are about %136:6 for city pairs without any direct ights. Therefore, without any
other controls, trade costs are about 25% lower for city pairs with at least one direct
ight. Similar comparisons can be made for international and intranational city pairs
as well, where city pairs with at least one direct ight have lower trade costs in
both cases. Regarding the distribution of trade costs, the Kernel density estimates
are given in Figure 2, where the city pairs that have direct ights between each other
have lower trade costs, independent of being international or intranational. Therefore,
direct ights seem to have a reducing e¤ect on trade costs between cities; nevertheless,
proving this claim requires a formal investigation, the results of which are depicted
in the next section.
We estimate Equation 7 with alternative combinations of the right hand side
variables using OLS as the benchmark case. However, existence of a direct ight
between any two cities may be endogenously determined by trade costs. Accordingly,
besides the benchmark case, we also consider an IV estimation (of Two-Stage Least
Squares, TSLS) to control for endogeneity. In the rst stage, the existence of a direct
ight is regressed on policy-based instruments by a linear probability model, and
the tted values of the rst stage are used to estimate Equation 7 in the second
stage.10 Using policy-based instruments is the key here in order to make sure that
10Needless to say, exogenous variables in Equation 7 (e.g., distance, border, language, colony, RTA,
city xed e¤ects) are included in both stages. We also consider two-way clustered standard errors
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the corresponding policy suggestions will be relevant for governments regarding their
international policies.
We consider four di¤erent sets of instruments in the rst stage estimation that are
depicted in Table 2. The instrument sets consist of ve policy variables at the country
level that are borrowed from Piermartini and Rousova (2013) who use a large data set
of approximately 2,300 air services agreements that were in force in 2005 among 184
countries. The timing of this data set perfectly matches the purpose of this paper,
since these instruments represent the initial conditions of countries, about ve years
before the collection of data on trade costs. The rst policy instrument is the Air
Liberalization Index (ALI) constructed by the WTO Secretariat (WTO 2006). It is
an expert-based index that measures how liberal the aviation agreements are between
countries; it considers the main features of air services agreements between countries
by assigning a weight to each provision included in the agreement, such as grant of
rights, capacity clause, pricing, withholding, designation, statistics and cooperative
arrangements. ALI ranges between 0 and 50, where 0 is associated with the most
restrictive agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal agreement across countries.
Factor Analysis Index (FAI) is another instrument introduced by Piermartini and
Rousova (2013) that has been obtained by means of factor analysis using the same
similar indicators with alternative weights; FAI ranges between zero and one, and
it increases with the degree of liberalization of the aviation market. Log E¤ective
at the city level that have been modied to control for biases due to having a two-stage estimator.
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Years (LEY) represent the number of years since the rst air services agreements
have entered into force, capturing the historical links between two countries in terms
of cooperation in aviation matters. Incident Investigation Procedures (IIP) in air
services agreements is a dummy variable for incident investigation that equals 1 if
investigation procedures in the event of an accident or forced landing by an aircraft
of one party in the territory of the other are covered by an air services agreement.
Security Cooperation Provision (SCP) in air services agreements is another dummy
variable for security cooperation taking a value of 1 if a provision is made for coop-
eration in situations involving aviation security, including actions taken to prevent,
suppress, or terminate threats or acts of unlawful interference. The reader is referred
to Piermartini and Rousova (2013) for further details of these policy instruments.
Since ALI and FAI are substitute indices for each other, we use alternative combina-
tion of these four variables to construct our set of instruments as depicted in Table
2.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Benchmark Case
The benchmark case results based on OLS are given in Table 3, where the e¤ects
of direct ights on trade costs are negative and signicant (at the 0.1% level), in-
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dependent of including the control variables.11 As is evident in column 5, which is
the case with all control variables includes to avoid any omitted variable bias, the
existence of a direct ight reduces trade costs by about 1.32% across cities. This is
much lower compared to Micco and Serebrisky (2006) who have shown that Open
Skies Agreements between countries reduce air transport costs by 9%; however, note
that we only focus on the e¤ect of direct ights, while they focus on both direct and
indirect ights potentially taking e¤ect due the international agreements.
The e¤ect of distance on trade costs is positive, as expected, where the coe¢ cient
estimate takes a value of about 0.05. This estimate corresponds to about 36% of
trade costs when the distance between cities is about 1000 miles; it is also consistent
with existing studies in the literature such as by Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014).
Nevertheless, there may be nonlinearities in the e¤ect of distance on trade costs; we
will consider such possibilities during the robustness checks, below.
Having an international border between cities also contributes to trade costs with
an additional e¤ect of about %15 percent. Therefore, direct ights have an additional
reduction impact on international trade costs compared to intranational trade costs.
Regarding other international e¤ects, having a common border (between the countries
where cities are located) reduces trade costs by about 11%, while having a common
language (between the countries where cities are located) reduces trade costs by about
11Since trade costs are at the city-pair level, cluster-robust standard errors are calculated at the
city level; such a strategy has been used to control for within-city-pair cross-city correlation in the
regression analyis.
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13%. Having a colonial relationship (between the countries where cities are located)
also reduces trade costs between cities by about 4%, and nally having an RTA
reduces trade costs by about 13%. Having a high explanatory power further supports
these results.
4.2 Robustness Checks
As the rst robustness check, we consider nonlinearities in the e¤ect of distance on
trade costs; the results are given in Table 4. While the rst column replicates the last
column of Table 3 for comparison purposes, the second column considers log distance
squared, and the remaining columns investigate the e¤ects of distance considering
ve distance intervals dened as the rst to fth 20th percentile of the distance data.
As is evident, both log distance and log distance squared are signicant in the second
column; hence, there is evidence for nonlinearity in the e¤ects of distance on trade
costs. This is also supported by the e¤ects of log distance intervals in columns (3)-
(6). The existence of a direct ight, which is the main focus of this paper, still
has negative e¤ects on trade costs in all columns, and its coe¢ cient is signicant
in all columns except for column (2). Therefore, there is still strong evidence for
the negative e¤ects of having direct ights on trade costs between cities, even after
considering for nonlinearities in distance measures.
As the second robustness check, we consider the potential endogeneity of having
direct ights between cities. As discussed in details above, this consists of a two-
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stage estimation, where the existence of a direct ight is investigated in the rst
stage through a linear probability model, and the tted values of this rst stage are
further used in the second stage to determine the e¤ects of direct ights on trade costs.
The results of the rst stage are given in Table 5, where we have (for sure) included
the exogenous variables of the second stage analysis as well, including nonlinearities
in distance. Each column represents a di¤erent set of instruments as dened in Table
2. Before moving to the details of the results, it is important to emphasize that the
considered instruments are relevant according to the F-test results in Table 5 showing
the signicance level of the instrument-relevance test results based on the joint null
hypothesis of the coe¢ cients of instruments being equal to zero.
Regarding the results, both Air Liberalization Index (ALI) and Factor Analysis
Index (FAI) a¤ect the existence of a direct ight positively. Therefore, if two cities
are located in two countries having an aviation agreement, it is more likely for these
cities to have a direct ight between each other. Log E¤ective Years (LEY) also
enter positively and signicantly to the rst stage estimation, meaning that as the
number of years for having an aviation agreement increases, the chances for the cities
located in these countries to have a direct ight also increases. Similarly, both Inci-
dent Investigation Procedures (IIP) and Security Cooperation Provision (SCP) in air
services agreements have positive e¤ects on the existence of a direct ight; i.e., if two
countries have such details in their agreement, there is a bigger chance that there will
be a direct ight between the cities located in these countries.
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When we investigate the e¤ects of standard gravity variables on the existence of
a direct ight in Table 5, it is evident that log distance enters the linear probability
regression positively and signicantly, while its squared value enters negatively and
signicantly. Therefore, direct ights are more available between cities that are re-
mote from each other, but as distance increases between cities, there are fewer direct
ights. This is potentially because of having longer ights as the distance increases be-
tween cities, which makes it economically less protable due to having fewer demand
between such cities; instead, indirect ights through connection hubs may be more
preferable in such cases. Having an international border between cities also decreases
the chances of having a direct ight between cities, meaning that direct ights are
more common across intranational city pairs. Having a common/land border across
countries where two cities are located also reduces the likelihood of having a direct
ight, potentially due to having easy access to other modes of transportation through
that border (e.g., European countries that have a common border). Having a com-
mon language also increases the possibility of having direct ights. Finally, having
a common language, a colonial relationship or a regional trade agreement also enter
positively and signicantly in most cases. High explanatory power in the regressions
support these results.
The tted values of the rst stage regressions, which represent direct ights de-
termined by policy instruments based on air services agreements, are further used to
investigate the e¤ects of direct ights on trade costs. The results are given in Table
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6, where the null hypothesis of the existence of a direct ight being exogenous is
rejected at the 10% level for Instrument Set #1 and at the 1% level for other set of
instruments. As is evident, the e¤ects of direct ights are negative and signicant
in all IV (TSLS) results, independent of the set of instruments used, although the
magnitude of the negative e¤ect changes across instrument sets.
4.3 Further Robustness
Information frictions have been shown to be higher internationally compared to in-
tranationally (e.g., see Hau, 2001). Accordingly, we would like to know whether the
existence of a direct ight a¤ects trade costs di¤erently when we consider interna-
tional versus intranational city pairs. The corresponding results are given in Table
7, where the results based on the interaction of the direct ight and an international
border are shown. As is evident, international direct ights correspond to lower trade
costs independent of the instruments used; however, the corresponding evidence on
the e¤ect of intranational direct ights are mixed. It is implied that our results of
direct ights corresponding to lower trade costs are mostly derived by international
rather than intranational direct ights. Therefore, the results are in line with the
existing literature based on higher international information barriers.
Although we consider city xed e¤ects in almost all of our regressions in order to
capture city-specic characteristics such as size and geographical location, for robust-
ness, we also consider an alternative city-pair dummy variable which takes a value of
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1 when both cities are coastal cities.12 We are particularly interested in the interac-
tion of this dummy variable with the existence of a direct ight in order to test the
hypothesis of whether direct ights have a di¤erent impact for coastal city pairs, since
such city pairs may have lower trade costs between each other. As is evident in Table
7, the corresponding results are mixed (i.e., they depend on the set of instruments
used), suggesting that direct ights do not necessarily a¤ect coastal city pairs in a
di¤erent way, after controlling for city xed e¤ects.
Finally, as mentioned by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Borraz et al. (2014), the
maximum price di¤erence across goods is sensitive to the possibility of measurement
errors in the price data. For example, prices may be misreported or posted outside
the no-arbitrage range. Accordingly, Eaton and Kortum (2002) have considered the
second maximum price di¤erence across goods, while Borraz et al. (2014) have con-
sidered alternative percentiles (e.g., 80th, 90th, etc.). Following these studies, besides
Equation 6, for robustness, we also considered the second maximum, together with
the 80th and 90th percentiles, of traded-input price di¤erences across goods between
cities as the measure of trade costs. Furthermore, we also considered alternative
airport locations such as within 100 and 200 miles of city centers. All of these inves-
tigations resulted in virtually the same result: having direct ights a¤ects trade costs
12Coastal cities are dened as cities that are at most 50 miles away from the closest shoreline. Such
calculations are achieved in Matlab using the exact location of cities (in terms of their latitudes and
longitudes) and the global self-consistent hierarchical high-resolution shoreline data of gshhs_f.b.gz.
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negatively and signicantly.13
5 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
The e¤ects of direct ights on trade costs are shown to be negative and signicant
across cities around the world. This result is supported by many robustness checks,
including the consideration of control variables, nonlinearities in the e¤ects of dis-
tance on trade costs, potential endogeneity of having direct ights between cities,
and alternative denitions of the data. Since air services agreements signed between
countries are shown to be e¤ective on the existence of direct ights, there is strong
evidence in favor of such policies that facilitate direct ights and thus reduce trade
costs.
In terms of the development of trade costs over time, the literature on economic
history has shown that the technological developments in ocean transportation were
important determinants of growing trade in the rst era of globalization during the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century. Hummels (2007) has argued that the technological
development in air transportation (due to the declining cost of rapid transportation)
has been a critical input into a second era of globalization during the latter half of
the twentieth century. Therefore, the existing literature has restricted the reasons
for globalization to the analysis of technology, which is not directly connected to in-
ternational government policies. In contrast, this paper suggests that globalization
13The results of these robustness checks are available upon request.
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(measured by the reduction in trade costs) can also be achieved through air services
liberalization across countries that has direct connections to international government
policies. Hence, one policy implication of this paper is that tari¤ rates and/or duties
are not the only trade policy tools that can be used to lower trade costs in order
to facilitate welfare increasing economic interaction between countries; other inter-
national trade policies through aviation services, such as Open Skies Agreements of
the U.S. or A Common Aviation Area Agreement and Euro-Mediterranean Aviation
Agreement of the E.U., are also e¤ective in reducing international trade costs.
Another policy implication is that direct ights facilitate the integration of internal
markets. This is in line with studies such as by Engel and Rogers (2004) who discuss
trade costs among the types of friction providing signicant barriers to the integration
of product markets, which has been the major conclusion of many researchers in the
literature investigating the price di¤erences across locations for several decades. This
paper has contributed to that literature by showing that trade costs can be reduced
through direct ights even within the same internal market; e.g., Multilateral Agree-
ment on the Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area signed by many
European countries among themselves to facilitate the integration of their internal
markets is a perfect example to this case.
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 Figure 1 - Cities in the Micro Price Data 
 
 
Notes: Each star represents a city in the micro price data. There are 433 cities in the sample. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Kernel Density of Trade Costs across Cities 
 
All City Pairs 
  
  
International City Pairs 
  
  
Intranational City Pairs 
  
Notes: For any given city pair, the trade costs are measured by the maximum of the absolute log price difference across 
goods. City pairs with direct flights are defined as the pairs that have direct flights between each other through an airport 
within 50 miles of the center city. The left panel shows the kernel estimation of the probability density function (pdf), 
while the right panel shows the kernel estimation of the cumulative density function (cdf). The sample size is 90,743. 
 Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 All City Pairs 
 
International City Pairs 
 
Intranational City Pairs 
Average Estimated Trade Costs between  
City Pairs with Direct Flights 
1.115  1.198  0.724 
Average Estimated Trade Costs between  
City Pairs without Direct Flights 
1.366  1.376  0.833 
Number of City Pairs with Direct Flights 10,676  8,818  1,858 
Number of City Pairs without Direct Flights 80,067  78,489  1,578 
Average Distance in Miles between  
City Pairs with Direct Flights 
1,913  2,138  845 
Average Distance in Miles between  
City Pairs without Direct Flights 
4,897  4,973  1,134 
 
Source: International city pairs are defined as the pairs that have an international border between them. Intranational city pairs are defined as the pairs that are 
located in the same country. The availability of the price data has been determined by considering the long-run relative prices between 2010-2014. The availability 
of the direct flights has been determined according to the data for 2013. Average Estimated Trade Costs represent the mean values of the estimated distributions 
given in Figure 2. 
 
 
Table 2 - Policy Instruments for Direct Flights 
 
Instrument Set #1 Instrument Set #2 Instrument Set #3 Instrument Set #4 
Air Liberalization Index (ALI) YES NO YES NO 
Factor Analysis Index (FAI) NO YES NO YES 
Log Effective Years (LEY)  
of an Air Services Agreements 
NO NO YES YES 
Incident Investigation Procedures (IIP) 
in Air Services Agreements 
NO NO YES YES 
Security Cooperation Provision (SCP) 
in Air Services Agreements 
NO NO YES YES 
 
Notes: ALI ranges between 0 and 50, where 0 is associated with the most restrictive agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal agreement. FAI ranges between 0 
and 1; it increases with the degree of liberalization of the aviation market. IIP is a dummy variable for incident investigation that equals 1 if investigation 
procedures in the event of an accident or forced landing by an aircraft of one party in the territory of the other are covered by an air services agreement. SCP is 
another dummy variable for security cooperation taking a value of 1 if a provision is made for cooperation in situations involving aviation security, including 
actions taken to prevent, suppress, or terminate threats or acts of unlawful interference. See Piermartini and Rousova (2013) for further details.
 Table 3 - Benchmark Estimation Results for Trade Costs 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
(4)  (5) 
 
OLS  OLS  OLS 
 
OLS  OLS 
  
 
 
 
  
   
Direct Flight -0.250***  -0.254***  -0.0720*** 
 
-0.0416***  -0.0132*** 
 
(0.00626)  (0.00412)  (0.00694) 
 
(0.00406)  (0.00395) 
  
 
 
 
  
   
Log Distance 
 
 
 
 0.105*** 
 
0.126***  0.0514*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00251) 
 
(0.00173)  (0.00255) 
International Border 
 
 
 
 0.366*** 
 
0.326***  0.151*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00776) 
 
(0.00708)  (0.00817) 
Common Border 
 
 
 
 
  
  -0.108*** 
  
 
 
 
  
  (0.00606) 
Common Language 
 
 
 
 
  
  -0.133*** 
  
 
 
 
  
  (0.00431) 
Colony 
 
 
 
 
  
  -0.0417*** 
  
 
 
 
  
  (0.00475) 
RTA 
 
 
 
 
  
  -0.134*** 
  
 
 
 
  
  (0.00436) 
  
 
 
 
  
   
City Fixed Effects NO  YES  NO 
 
YES  YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.016  0.744  0.058 
 
0.782  0.795 
Sample Size 90,743  90,743  90,743 
 
90,743  57,963 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by OLS in all columns. 
Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses.  
Table 4 - Estimation Results for Trade Costs: Nonlinearities in Distance Measures 
 
  Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6) 
 
OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
 
OLS  OLS 
  
 
 
   
  
   
Direct Flight -0.0132***  -0.00587  -0.0629***  -0.0332*** 
 
-0.0462***  -0.00810* 
 
(0.00395)  (0.00390)  (0.00686)  (0.00400) 
 
(0.00680)  (0.00394) 
  
 
 
   
  
   
Log Distance 0.0514***  -0.0900***    
  
   
 
(0.00255)  (0.0144)    
  
   
Log Distance Squared 
 
 0.00997***    
  
   
  
 (0.00100)    
  
   
Log Distance Interval #1 
 
 
 
 0.0745***  0.0862*** 
 
0.0369***  0.0203*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00680)  (0.00377) 
 
(0.00738)  (0.00380) 
Log Distance Interval #2 
 
 
 
 0.109***  0.0999*** 
 
0.0592***  0.0273*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00556)  (0.00327) 
 
(0.00604)  (0.00336) 
Log Distance Interval #3 
 
 
 
 0.0864***  0.1000*** 
 
0.0351***  0.0273*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00529)  (0.00304) 
 
(0.00582)  (0.00323) 
Log Distance Interval #4 
 
 
 
 0.0930***  0.103*** 
 
0.0460***  0.0354*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00515)  (0.00296) 
 
(0.00565)  (0.00313) 
Log Distance Interval #5 
 
 
 
 0.0847***  0.0924*** 
 
0.0554***  0.0272*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00493)  (0.00289) 
 
(0.00546)  (0.00308) 
International Border 0.151***  0.161***  0.357***  0.343*** 
 
0.0103  0.166*** 
 
(0.00817)  (0.00805)  (0.00785)  (0.00708) 
 
(0.0115)  (0.00818) 
Common Border -0.108***  -0.105***    
  
-0.0234**  -0.120*** 
 
(0.00606)  (0.00601)    
  
(0.00880)  (0.00611) 
Common Language -0.133***  -0.142***    
  
-0.220***  -0.128*** 
 
(0.00431)  (0.00441)    
  
(0.00578)  (0.00463) 
Colony -0.0417***  -0.0364***    
  
-0.0439***  -0.0413*** 
 
(0.00475)  (0.00468)    
  
(0.00928)  (0.00492) 
RTA -0.134***  -0.124***    
  
-0.230***  -0.123*** 
 
(0.00436)  (0.00443)    
  
(0.00800)  (0.00458) 
  
 
 
   
  
   
City Fixed Effects YES  YES  NO  YES 
 
NO  YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.795  0.795  0.076  0.788 
 
0.155  0.795 
Sample Size 57,963  57,963  90,743  90,743 
 
57,963  57,963 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. Log Distance Intervals #1-5 correspond to the 
first-fifth 20th percentile of the distance measures in order to consider possible nonlinearities. The estimation is by OLS in 
all columns. Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses.  
 
Table 5 - Estimation Results for the Existence of a Direct Flight 
 
Dependent Variable: Existence of a Direct Flight 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
(4) 
 
LPR  LPR  LPR 
 
LPR 
 
Instrument Set #1  Instrument Set #2  Instrument Set #3 
 
Instrument Set #4 
        ALI 0.00242***  
 
 0.00169*** 
 
 
 
(0.000157)  
 
 (0.000175) 
 
 
FAI 
 
 0.0731***  
  
0.0447*** 
  
 (0.00680)  
  
(0.00749) 
LEY 
 
 
 
 0.0157*** 
 
0.0149*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00202) 
 
(0.00203) 
IIP 
 
 
 
 0.0553*** 
 
0.0683*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00586) 
 
(0.00569) 
SCP 
 
 
 
 0.0291*** 
 
0.0336*** 
  
 
 
 (0.00396) 
 
(0.00397) 
Log Distance 0.465***  0.453***  0.473*** 
 
0.466*** 
 
(0.0234)  (0.0233)  (0.0233) 
 
(0.0232) 
Log Distance Squared -0.0412***  -0.0405***  -0.0414*** 
 
-0.0409*** 
 
(0.00155)  (0.00154)  (0.00154) 
 
(0.00153) 
International Border -0.155***  -0.178***  -0.165*** 
 
-0.173*** 
 
(0.0115)  (0.0113)  (0.0127) 
 
(0.0126) 
Common Border -0.0711***  -0.0766***  -0.0547*** 
 
-0.0554*** 
 
(0.00771)  (0.00770)  (0.00781) 
 
(0.00782) 
Common Language 0.0486***  0.0476***  0.0369*** 
 
0.0349*** 
 
(0.00501)  (0.00506)  (0.00514) 
 
(0.00516) 
Colony 0.00694  0.00305  0.0112+ 
 
0.00924 
 
(0.00618)  (0.00618)  (0.00620) 
 
(0.00620) 
RTA 0.0152***  0.0297***  -0.000912 
 
0.00497 
 
(0.00456)  (0.00445)  (0.00471) 
 
(0.00467) 
  
 
 
 
  
 
City Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES 
 
YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427  0.426  0.429 
 
0.429 
F-test (Relevance) 240.894  116.942  91.109 
 
80.614 
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
 
[0.000] 
Sample Size 57,963  57,963  57,963 
 
57,963 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by linear probability 
regression (LPR) in all columns; instruments are defined in Table 2. Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city 
level are in parentheses. F-test (Relevance) shows the instrument-relevance test results based on the joint null hypothesis 
of the coefficients of instruments being equal to zero; the corresponding p-values are given in brackets. 
 
Table 6 - Two-Step Estimation Results for Trade Costs 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs 
  
 (1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
  
 IV  IV 
 
IV  IV 
  
 Instrument Set #1  Instrument Set #2 
 
Instrument Set #3  Instrument Set #4 
          
Direct Flight 
 
 -0.117+  -0.523*** 
 
-0.415***  -0.518*** 
  
 (0.0611)  (0.103) 
 
(0.0505)  (0.0567) 
  
 
 
 
  
   
Log Distance 
 
 -0.0420  0.133** 
 
0.0866**  0.131*** 
  
 (0.0299)  (0.0475) 
 
(0.0265)  (0.0291) 
Log Distance Squared 
 
 0.00559*  -0.0104* 
 
-0.00612**  -0.0102*** 
  
 (0.00261)  (0.00423) 
 
(0.00224)  (0.00247) 
International Border 
 
 0.138***  0.0556* 
 
0.0776***  0.0567*** 
  
 (0.0145)  (0.0225) 
 
(0.0135)  (0.0148) 
Common Border 
 
 -0.114***  -0.145*** 
 
-0.137***  -0.145*** 
  
 (0.00776)  (0.0109) 
 
(0.00792)  (0.00850) 
Common Language 
 
 -0.138***  -0.121*** 
 
-0.125***  -0.121*** 
  
 (0.00506)  (0.00654) 
 
(0.00530)  (0.00562) 
Colony 
 
 -0.0364***  -0.0365*** 
 
-0.0365***  -0.0365*** 
  
 (0.00470)  (0.00556) 
 
(0.00523)  (0.00555) 
RTA 
 
 -0.119***  -0.102*** 
 
-0.107***  -0.102*** 
  
 (0.00508)  (0.00645) 
 
(0.00525)  (0.00552) 
  
 
 
 
  
   
City Fixed Effects 
 
 YES  YES 
 
YES  YES 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
 0. 792  0. 730 
 
0. 754  0.731 
F-test (Endogeneity) 
 
 3.370  32.545 
 
79.625  108.688 
  
 [0.066]  [0.000] 
 
[0.000]  [0.000] 
Sample Size 
 
 57,963  57,963 
 
57,963  57,963 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by IV (TSLS). Instrument 
Set #1-4 correspond to instrumenting the existence of Direct Flights with policy instruments defined in Table 2. Cluster-
robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses. F-test (Endogeneity) shows the regression-based 
endogeneity test results based on the null hypothesis of the existence of a direct flight being exogenous; the corresponding 
p-values are given in brackets. 
Table 7 - Two-Step Estimation Results for Trade Costs: Additional Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Trade Costs     
  
 (1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  
 IV  IV 
 
IV  IV  IV  IV 
  
 Instrument Set #3  Instrument Set #4 
 
Instrument Set #3  Instrument Set #4  Instrument Set #3  Instrument Set #4 
  
 
 
 
  
       
Direct Flight 
 
 
 
 
  
-0.887***  -0.601***     
  
 
 
 
  
(0.131)  (0.110)     
International Direct Flight   -0.782***  -0.550***      -1.031***  -0.599*** 
   (0.120)  (0.0931)      (0.147)  (0.113) 
Intranational Direct Flight   1.239**  -0.377      0.291  -0.646 
   (0.462)  (0.312)      (0.554)  (0.477) 
  
 
 
 
  
       
CoastalPair*DirectFlight 
 
 
 
 
  
1.649***  0.332  1.313**  0.359 
  
 
 
 
  
(0.388)  (0.375)  (0.411)  (0.469) 
Log Distance 
 
 -0.0335  0.121*** 
 
0.237***  0.156***  0.128+  0.161** 
  
 (0.0500)  (0.0354) 
 
(0.0504)  (0.0405)  (0.0703)  (0.0622) 
Log Distance Squared 
 
 -0.000119  -0.00969*** 
 
-0.0163***  -0.0117***  -0.0103*  -0.0120** 
  
 (0.00347)  (0.00266) 
 
(0.00386)  (0.00305)  (0.00469)  (0.00396) 
International Border 
 
 1.113***  0.145 
 
0.00666  0.0448*  0.698*  0.0201 
  
 (0.285)  (0.194) 
 
(0.0257)  (0.0202)  (0.317)  (0.259) 
Common Border 
 
 -0.136***  -0.145*** 
 
-0.122***  -0.141***  -0.124***  -0.140*** 
  
 (0.0105)  (0.00860) 
 
(0.0122)  (0.00976)  (0.0121)  (0.0103) 
Common Language 
 
 -0.117***  -0.121*** 
 
-0.108***  -0.118***  -0.106***  -0.118*** 
  
 (0.00769)  (0.00608) 
 
(0.00867)  (0.00670)  (0.00871)  (0.00669) 
Colony 
 
 -0.0385***  -0.0367*** 
 
-0.0320***  -0.0356***  -0.0343***  -0.0355*** 
  
 (0.00691)  (0.00565) 
 
(0.00800)  (0.00567)  (0.00793)  (0.00585) 
RTA 
 
 -0.0655***  -0.0989*** 
 
-0.121***  -0.106***  -0.0910***  -0.107*** 
  
 (0.0128)  (0.00975) 
 
(0.00746)  (0.00657)  (0.0152)  (0.0143) 
City Fixed Effects 
 
 YES  YES 
 
YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
 0.584  0.728 
 
0.536  0.727  0.556  0.726 
F-test (Endogeneity) 
 
 52.409  54.247 
 
56.960  54.589  41.285  36.335 
  
 [0.000]  [0.000] 
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sample Size 
 
 57,963  57,963 
 
57,963  57,963  57,963  57,963 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. The estimation is by IV (TSLS). Instrument Set #3-4 correspond to instrumenting the existence of Direct Flights with 
policy instruments defined in Table 2. Cluster-robust standard errors calculated at the city level are in parentheses. F-test (Endogeneity) shows the regression-based endogeneity test results based on 
the null hypothesis of the existence of a direct flight being exogenous; the corresponding p-values are given in brackets. 
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Table A.1 - Traded Goods in the Micro Price Data 
Good Code  Traded Goods  Traded-Input Share 
1  Imported Beer (0.33 liter bottle)  0.45 
2  Coke/Pepsi (0.33 liter bottle)  0.26 
3  Water (0.33 liter bottle)  0.14 
4  Milk (regular), (1 liter)  0.61 
5  Eggs (12)  0.49 
6  Water (1.5 liter bottle)  0.33 
7  Bottle of Wine (Mid-Range)  0.42 
8  Imported Beer (0.33 liter bottle)  0.50 
9  Pack of Cigarettes (Marlboro)  0.20 
10  Chicken Breasts (Boneless, Skinless), (1kg)  0.43 
11  Gasoline (1 liter)  0.40 
12  Volkswagen Golf 1.4 90 KW Trendline (Or Equivalent New Car)  0.49 
13  1 Pair of Jeans (Levis 501 Or Similar)  0.46 
14  1 Summer Dress in a Chain Store (Zara, H&M, ...)  0.62 
15  1 Pair of Nike Shoes  0.64 
16  1 Pair of Men Leather Shoes  0.51 
17  Apples (1kg)  0.52 
18  Oranges (1kg)  0.45 
19  Potato (1kg)  0.30 
20  Lettuce (1 head)  0.41 
21  Rice (white), (1kg)  0.44 
22  Tomato (1kg)  0.27 
 
Notes: Traded-input shares represent the estimated values. 
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Table A.2 - Cities in the Micro Price Data 
City City City City City City City City City 
Aachen, Germany Bhopal, India Cologne, Germany Grenoble, France Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Phnom Penh, Cambodia Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil Tunis, Tunisia 
Aalborg, Denmark Bhubenswar, India Colombo, Sri Lanka Groningen, Netherlands Kowloon, Hong Kong Milwaukee, WI, United States Phoenix, AZ, United States Sao Paulo, Brazil Turin, Italy 
Abbotsford, Canada Bialystok, Poland Columbus, OH, United States Guadalajara, Mexico Krakow (Cracow), Poland Minneapolis, MN, United States Phuket, Thailand Sarajevo, Bosnia And Herzegovina Turku, Finland 
Aberdeen, United Kingdom Bilbao, Spain Copenhagen, Denmark Guangzhou, China Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Minsk, Belarus Pittsburgh, PA, United States Saskatoon, Canada Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Birmingham, United Kingdom Cork, Ireland Guatemala City, Guatemala Kuching, Malaysia Mississauga, Canada Plovdiv, Bulgaria Seattle, WA, United States Utrecht, Netherlands 
Accra, Ghana Bogota, Colombia Coventry, United Kingdom Guildford, United Kingdom Kuwait City, Kuwait Monterrey, Mexico Port Elizabeth, South Africa Seoul, South Korea Vadodara, India 
Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia Boise, ID, United States Cuenca, Ecuador Gurgaon, India Lagos, Nigeria Montevideo, Uruguay Portland, OR, United States Sevilla, Spain Valencia, Spain 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Bologna, Italy Curitiba, Brazil Haifa, Israel Lahore, Pakistan Montreal, Canada Porto Alegre, Brazil Shanghai, China Vancouver, Canada 
Adelaide, Australia Bordeaux, France Dallas, TX, United States Halifax, Canada Larnaca, Cyprus Moscow, Russia Porto, Portugal Sharjah, United Arab Emirates Varna, Bulgaria 
Ahmedabad, India Boston, MA, United States Damascus, Syria Hamburg, Germany Las Vegas, NV, United States Mumbai, India Poznan, Poland Shenzhen, China Venice, Italy 
Akron, OH, United States Brampton, Canada Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Hamilton, Canada Lausanne, Switzerland Munich, Germany Prague, Czech Republic Shiraz, Iran Verona, Italy 
Albuquerque, NM, United States Brasilia, Brazil Darwin, Australia Hanoi, Vietnam Leeds, United Kingdom Muscat, Oman Pretoria, South Africa Singapore, Singapore Vicenza, Italy 
Alexandria, Egypt Brasov, Romania Davao, Philippines Harare, Zimbabwe Leicester, United Kingdom Nagpur, India Pristina, Serbia Skopje, Macedonia Victoria, Canada 
Algiers, Algeria Bratislava, Slovakia Delhi, India Hartford, CT, United States Leiden, Netherlands Nairobi, Kenya Puerto Vallarta, Mexico Sliema, Malta Vienna, Austria 
Alicante, Spain Brighton, United Kingdom Denver, CO, United States Helsinki, Finland Lille, France Nanaimo, BC, Canada Pune, India Sofia, Bulgaria Vilnius, Lithuania 
Almaty, Kazakhstan Brisbane, Australia Detroit, MI, United States Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam Lima, Peru Naples, Italy Punta del Este, Uruguay Split, Croatia Visakhapatnam, India 
Amman, Jordan Bristol, United Kingdom Dhaka, Bangladesh Hobart, Australia Limassol, Cyprus Nashville, TN, United States Quebec City, Canada Spokane, WA, United States Vladivostok, Russia 
Amsterdam, Netherlands Brno, Czech Republic Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine Hong Kong, Hong Kong Lisbon, Portugal Nasik, India Quezon City, Philippines Stavanger, Norway Warsaw, Poland 
Anchorage, AK, United States Brussels, Belgium Doha, Qatar Honolulu, HI, United States Liverpool, United Kingdom Navi Mumbai, India Quito, Ecuador Stockholm, Sweden Washington, DC, United States 
Ankara, Turkey Bucharest, Romania Donetsk, Ukraine Houston, TX, United States Ljubljana, Slovenia New Orleans, LA, United States Raleigh, NC, United States Strasbourg, France Waterloo, Canada 
Antalya, Turkey Budapest, Hungary Dresden, Germany Huntsville, AL, United States Lodz, Poland New York, NY, United States Reading, United Kingdom Stuttgart, Germany Wellington, New Zealand 
Antwerp, Belgium Buenos Aires, Argentina Dubai, United Arab Emirates Hyderabad, India London, Canada Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom Recife, Brazil Surabaya, Indonesia West Palm Beach, FL, United States 
Arhus, Denmark Buffalo, NY, United States Dublin, Ireland Iasi, Romania London, United Kingdom Nice, France Regina, Canada Surat, India Wichita, KS, United States 
Asheville, NC, United States Bursa, Turkey Dunedin, New Zealand Indianapolis, IN, United States Los Angeles, CA, United States Nicosia, Cyprus Reno, NV, United States Surrey, Canada Windhoek, Namibia 
Athens, Greece Busan, South Korea Durban, South Africa Indore, India Louisville, KY, United States Nis, Serbia Reykjavik, Iceland Sydney, Australia Windsor, Canada 
Atlanta, GA, United States Bydgoszcz, Poland Dusseldorf, Germany Irbil, Iraq Luanda, Angola Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia Richmond, VA, United States Szczecin, Poland Winnipeg, Canada 
Auckland, New Zealand Cairns, Australia Edinburgh, United Kingdom Islamabad, Pakistan Lublin, Poland Noida, India Riga, Latvia Taichung, Taiwan Wroclaw, Poland 
Austin, TX, United States Cairo, Egypt Edmonton, Canada Istanbul, Turkey Ludhiana, India Nottingham, United Kingdom Rijeka, Croatia Taipei, Taiwan Yangon, Myanmar 
Baghdad, Iraq Calgary, Canada Eindhoven, Netherlands Izmir, Turkey Lugano, Switzerland Novi Sad, Serbia Rio De Janeiro, Brazil Tallinn, Estonia Yekaterinburg, Russia 
Bahrain, Bahrain Cambridge, United Kingdom Esfahan, Iran Jacksonville, FL, United States Luxembourg, Luxembourg Novosibirsk, Russia Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Tampa, FL, United States Yerevan, Armenia 
Baku, Azerbaijan Campinas, Brazil Espoo, Finland Jaipur, India Lviv, Ukraine Nuremberg, Germany Roanoke, VA, United States Tampere, Finland Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
Bali, Indonesia Canberra, Australia Florence, Italy Jakarta, Indonesia Lyon, France Odesa, Ukraine Rochester, NY, United States Tartu, Estonia Zagreb, Croatia 
Baltimore, MD, United States Cancun, Mexico Florianopolis, Brazil Jeddah (Jiddah), Saudi Arabia Macao, Macao Oklahoma City, OK, United States Rome, Italy Tashkent, Uzbekistan Zurich, Switzerland 
Bandung, Indonesia Cape Town, South Africa Fort Lauderdale, FL, United States Jerusalem, Israel Madison, WI, United States Omaha, NE, United States Rostov-na-donu, Russia Tbilisi, Georgia 
 Bangalore, India Caracas, Venezuela Fort Worth, TX, United States Johannesburg, South Africa Madrid, Spain Orlando, FL, United States Rotterdam, Netherlands Tehran, Iran 
 Bangkok, Thailand Cardiff, United Kingdom Fortaleza, Brazil Johor Baharu, Malaysia Makati, Philippines Osaka, Japan Sacramento, CA, United States Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel 
 Banja Luka, Bosnia And Herzegovina Casablanca, Morocco Frankfurt, Germany Kampala, Uganda Malaga, Spain Osijek, Croatia Saint Louis, MO, United States Thane, India 
 Barcelona, Spain Cebu, Philippines Fredericton, Canada Kansas City, MO, United States Malmo, Sweden Oslo, Norway Saint Petersburg, Russia The Hague, Netherlands 
 Barrie, Canada Chandigarh, India Gaborone, Botswana Karachi, Pakistan Manama, Bahrain Ottawa, Canada Salt Lake City, UT, United States Thessaloniki, Greece 
 Basel, Switzerland Charlotte, NC, United States Galway, Ireland Kathmandu, Nepal Manchester, United Kingdom Oxford, United Kingdom Salvador, Brazil Thiruvananthapuram, India 
 Beersheba, Israel Chennai, India Gdansk, Poland Katowice, Poland Manila, Philippines Padova, Italy San Antonio, TX, United States Timisoara, Romania 
 Beijing, China Chiang Mai, Thailand Geneva, Switzerland Kaunas, Lithuania Maribor, Slovenia Panama City, Panama San Diego, CA, United States Tirana, Albania 
 Beirut, Lebanon Chicago, IL, United States Genoa, Italy Kelowna, Canada Marseille, France Paphos, Cyprus San Francisco, CA, United States Tokyo, Japan 
 Belfast, United Kingdom Chisinau, Moldova Gent, Belgium Kharkiv, Ukraine Medellin, Colombia Paris, France San Jose, CA, United States Tomsk, Russia 
 Belgrade, Serbia Christchurch, New Zealand Glasgow, United Kingdom Khartoum, Sudan Melbourne, Australia Patras, Greece San Jose, Costa Rica Toronto, Canada 
 Belo Horizonte, Brazil Cincinnati, OH, United States Goa, India Kiev, Ukraine Memphis, TN, United States Pattaya, Thailand San Juan, Puerto Rico Toulouse, France 
 Bergamo, Italy Cleveland, OH, United States Goiania, Brazil Kingston, Jamaica Merida, Mexico Penang, Malaysia San Salvador, El Salvador Trieste, Italy 
 Bergen, Norway Cluj-napoca, Romania Gold Coast, Australia Kitchener, Canada Mexico City, Mexico Perth, Australia Santa Barbara, CA, United States Tripoli, Libya 
 Berlin, Germany Coimbatore, India Gothenburg, Sweden Kochi, India Miami, FL, United States Petaling Jaya, Malaysia Santiago, Chile Trondheim, Norway 
 Bern, Switzerland Coimbra, Portugal Graz, Austria Kolkata, India Milan, Italy Philadelphia, PA, United States Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Tucson, AZ, United States 
 
 
